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DELINQUENT, DEPENDENT, AND NEGLECTED
CHILDREN UNDER THE FAMILY COURT
AND YOUTH COMMISSION ACTS
MARGARET M. EISENDRATH
OT QUITE a decade ago, an article surveying the legal machinery
in Illinois for convicting, sentencing, and correcting youth-
ful offenders was entitled "Criminals or Delinquents?-An-
other Illinois Merry-Go-Round!"' 1 This "merry-go-round" had re-
sulted from the overlap of jurisdiction of the Family Court and the
criminal court, and from the consequences attending the child's rout-
ing to one or another of a variety of correctional institutions. Since
that time, the "merry-go-round" in the disposition of young offend-
ers as between institutions has been checked by the statutory creation
of the Youth Commission, but the initial problem of whether a child
is to face the Family Court or the criminal court remains unchanged
for constitutional reasons.2 Meanwhile, substantial questions of justice
persist concerning the relationship of State, parent, and child and
concerning the techniques to be employed by the Family Court in
working out those relationships in any concrete case.
WHAT HAS BECOME OF THE "MERRY-GO-ROUND"?
The Family Court, in Cook County a branch of the Circuit Court
and elsewhere a function of the County Court, was established by
statute3 to exercise the historic chancery jurisdiction over the persons
and property of infants.4 It serves dependent and neglected children
under the age of eighteen as well as delinquent boys under seventeen
and girls under eighteen.
It is sometimes startling to attorneys, who have never before ap-
' Weiss, 34 Cii. B. REc. 151 (1953).
2 People v. Lattimore, 362 IMI. 206, 199 N.E. 275 (1935).
3 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, SS 2001-36 (1959).
4 People ex rel. Ryan v. Sempek, 12 Ill.2d 581, 147 N.E.2d 321 (1958).
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peared in the Family Court but who are accustomed to traditional
criminal procedure, to find the Family Court hearing on the case of
a youth charged with being a delinquent child conducted by the
Family Court in privacy as an informal, non-criminal proceeding
meant to dispense individualized justice. This discomfiture is under-
standable, not only because of the novelty of the experience to the
attorney, but also because the court has the option of committing a
delinquent child beyond the control of his parents to the Youth Com-
mission-a destination mandatory for a child in the same age bracket
convicted in the criminal court of any crime except treason, homicide,
rape, or kidnapping." It is small comfort to be told that the court will
do so only as a last resort, for this power is a sweeping one. Under
the Family Court Act a delinquent child is defined as one who
violates any law of this State; or is incorrigible, or knowingly associates with
thieves, vicious or immoral persons; or without just cause and without the
consent of its parents, guardian or custodian absents itself from its home or
place of abode, or is growing up in idleness or crime; ... or wanders about the
streets in the night without being on any lawful business or lawful occupation;
... or uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language in any public
place or about any schoolhouse; or is guilty of indecent or lascivious conduct.6
This definition holds a young person-by hypothesis, one who has
not attained the age of wisdom-to a higher standard of conduct than
that required of his elders, who generally loaf or swear with impunity.
In the interest of fair play, it is suggested that no child should be
exposed by statute to "correction" by the State except for behavior
reasonably demonstrating that, without such measures, he is unlikely
to be able to conform to the standards which will be expected of him
as an adult. The requirement that a child, like an adult, conform to
the laws of this State is certainly one valid standard, but discussion
of the other elements of the definition of "delinquent child" is beyond
the scope of this article.
A violation of the law of the State may also be a "crime" when
committed by a child who has attained the age of criminal responsi-
bility. It had been the plan of the Family Court Act that, in the case
of a delinquent child above the age of criminal responsibility whose
act constituted a violation of the criminal law and who might not
benefit from treatment in the Family Court, the court should have
5 ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, S§ 801,803 (1959).
6 ILL. R v. STAT. ch. 23, S 2001 (1959).
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the discretion to permit such child to be subjected to criminal process.7
That plan was disrupted by the decision in People v. Lattimore.' It
was there held that the jurisdiction of the criminal court of Cook
County was paramount, having been defined by the Illinois Constitu-
tion, and that the juvenile (now Family) court, being a creature of
statute, could not "stay a court created by the constitution from
proceeding with the trial of a cause jurisdiction of which is expressly
granted to it by the constitution. '
The consequence of this decision is that the State's Attorney may
determine whether a child of Family Court age who has attained the
age of criminal responsibility shall be prosecuted criminally for an
act in violation of the Criminal Code, or whether a proceeding in
Family Court shall be permitted instead. The lodging in the State's
Attorney (who may well be the only attorney in the courtroom) of
the power to override the discretion of the judge creates an unwhole-
some situation. So far as the State represents the People as prosecutor,
this interest conflicts with its interest in the child as parens patriae,
and thus the State's Attorney does not necessarily represent the in-
terest of the child before the Family Court.
This area of concurrent jurisdiction of the Family Court and the
criminal court, complicated as it is by the transfer of responsibility
from the judge to a partisan in the case to decide which court shall
proceed, is the portion of the "merry-go-round" situation which re-
mains unchanged. Had the Judicial Amendment to the Illinois Consti-
tution succeeded in the 1958 referendum, the anomaly could have
been resolved by the necessary implementing legislation. Unless and
until the Supreme Court overrules the Lattimore case, the difficulty
will remain unless: (1) judicial reform should succeed; or (2) the
age of criminal responsibility be raised so as to carve out an enlarged
area beneath it within which the Family Court would have exclusive
jurisdiction.
In 1953, the "merry-go-round" disposition of youthful offenders
came to a halt. The Youth Commission Act,10 passed in that year,
was designed to systematize the sorting out of individuals to appro-
priate institutions, and the Commission obtained a facility for this
purpose with the opening of the diagnostic reception center for boys
near Joliet early in 1959.
7 Ii. Rv. STAT. ch. 23, S 2014 (1959). 9 Id. at 209,199 N.E. at 276.
8 362 M1. 206, 199 N.E. 275 (1935). 10 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, §S 2501-32 (1959).
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Prior to 1953, the institution to which an offender might be com-
mitted depended upon the court through which he had been chan-
neled, the attitude of the State's Attorney, and the determination of
the judge. Neither the individual nor the institution had any recourse
if the individual were sent to a facility unsuited to his needs." The
Youth Commission was established to take over existing correctional
institutions and services, to receive boys under seventeen and girls
under eighteen committed to it either by the Family Court or the
criminal court, to make a diagnosis, and to establish a program for each
individual.1 2 The Commission may place the person in whichever of
its facilities it deems most appropriate, or may transfer him from one
such institution to another; it may order release on parole or order
replacement or renewed parole; or it may even discharge the person
from its custody and control. Its control over a person committed to
it may never extend beyond the time he becomes twenty-one. Control
may be terminated earlier by an order of discharge by the Commission,
or by the expiration of the maximum sentence in the case of a crim-
inal; if the maximum sentence has not expired and the person com-
mitted criminally has not been discharged by the Youth Commission
by his twenty-first birthday, he must be turned over to the Depart-
ment of Public Safety or to the Parole and Pardon Board.' 3
In addition to these duties, administered by its Division of Correc-
tional Services, the Youth Commission also administers a Division of
Community Services to be concerned with the prevention of delin-
quency and the development of and cooperation with community
resources.'
4
The Youth Commission Act has withstood an attack upon its
constitutionality as an unlawful delegation of judicial power, in a case
involving the sentencing of two boys under seventeen on a criminal
charge. In People v. Fowler5 the court stated:
In performing its duties with respect to the management and rehabilitation
of the offender, the commission is merely executing the sentence. The sentence
itself is not changed or altered, and statutes prescribing such duties do not
confer judicial powers on the administrative body.16
11 Weiss, supra note 1.
12 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2501-32 (1959).
'3 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, S 2523 (1959).
14 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, S§ 2525, 2526 (1959).
15 14 l1.2d 252, 151 N.E.2d 324 (1958).
16 Id. at 260, 151 N.E.2d at 329.
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WHAT OTHER PROBLEMS ARE CURRENT?
Both in delinquency and in dependency or neglect cases the Fam-
ily Court must decide whether a child should remain in his home,
and it has the power to order changes of custody, either temporarily,
as by placement in a foster home or other facility (including the
Youth Commission in the delinquency cases), or permanently, in the
instances where it may appoint a guardian to consent to adoption.'
(At the time of this writing, there remains a discrepancy between
the provisions of the 1959 Adoption Act as to when a child is adopt-
able, and section 15 of the Family Court Act; this should be remedied
before adjournment of the current session of the General Assembly.)Is
The Family Court Act definition does not distinguish between a
"dependent" child (ordinarily thought of as one whose parents
through some misfortune are unable to provide for him) and a "neg-
lected" child (ordinarily thought of as one whose parents have not
bothered to care for him); moreover, it includes every child under
eighteen dependent upon the public for support.19 Inherent in this
definition is a question of public policy: that is, whether measures
appropriate for exercise by the court in a case of parental neglect
should apply equally in the case of dependency or in the case of a
child otherwise well cared for who may be sustained in his home by
public funds. This question, best directed to the legislature, goes to
the underlying problem of when the State may or should intervene
in the parent-child relationship and in that sense is related to questions
raised in recent cases.
Considerations that should guide the court in determining when
and whether to sever a parent-child relationship were discussed in
Giacopelli v. Florence Crittenton Home,'20 one of the rare depend-
ency cases to have been appealed. A married woman had concealed
from her husband the birth of their child, had represented the child
to be illegitimate and had consented to a finding of dependency, grant-
ing consent to its adoption. The Supreme Court of Illinois ruled in a
dispute between the natural parents and the adoptive parents that the
natural parent's superior right to the custody of his child is not abso-
lute and
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2009, 2012, 2013 (1959).
1s Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, S 9.1-1 (1959), with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, S 2026
(1959).
19 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2001 (1959).
20 16 I1l.2d 556, 158 N.E.2d 613 (1959).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
only obtains when it is in accord with the best interest of the child. The parent
need not be shown to be totally unfit to rear the child in order to deny to him
the custody of the child. Fitness of the parent is only one of the factors to be
considered in determining how the best interest of the child may be served. 21
A concurring opinion expresses concern that "some contours should
be given to the nebulous phrase 'best interests of the child.'" "To de-
prive natural parents of their child, in my opinion, requires more than
someone else's idea of what is best for it, even if that someone else is a
court,"22 stated Justice Klingbiel, who, along with two other members
of the court, felt it necessary that the parents be found unfit before
their child be taken from them against their will.
The unpublished decretal order in the matter of the Kozmin chil-
dren2s fills in some of these contours. A Russian couple had come to
the United States with three boys who were declared to be dependent
children and placed in foster homes because of the parents' commit-
ment to a mental hospital in consequence of their difficulties in adjust-
ing to their life here. After the discharge of the parents from the hos-
pital, another child was born. Not long afterward the family went on
relief and the fourth child was thereupon declared a dependent and
ward of the court. The parents' desire to take all four children with
them when they returned to Russia required the court to decide
whether to relinquish its guardianship over the children. In its decretal
order the court adverted to the presumption that the parental right to
the care and custody of children is good as against all the world unless
that right is forfeited. Under our form of government, the order con-
tinues:
We respect and maintain the dignity of the individual and uphold his right
to live naturally and freely in and with his family so long as he respects those
same rights in others. The state is subservient to the individual and his family.
Other governments may hold that the state is paramount and all other rights
are derived from it and the individual only lives for and by the government.
The freedom to live and pursue happiness in accordance with our dedicated
philosophy must nevertheless be recognized and upheld by our courts.2 4
In drawing the conclusion that the State had not sustained its burden
of proving the unfitness of these parents, the trial court's order stated:
As we respect race and color, so under our principles of democracy we re-
spect the creed of the individual. Creed is defined as belief, faith, religion,
philosophy. If natural parents are to have their children, then they must have
21 Id. at 565, 158 N.E.2d at 618. 22 Id. at 567, 158 N.E.2d at 619.
23 In the Matter of Kozmin, Decretal Order Nos. 220638, 220639, 220640, 237888,
Fanily Ct., Cook County, August 19, 1959.
24 Id. at 4.
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the right to care, educate and train them. We cannot, therefore, substitute our
beliefs or restrict their limits of education and training so as to fit our
standards.25
A recent serious threat to the effective function of the Family Court
consists of dictum in the case of In re Dependency of Rosmis.2 6 The
court there upset a finding of dependency with appointment of a
guardian and change of custody for lack of the jurisdictional findings
that the mother was an "unfit or improper" guardian, or was "unable
or unwilling to care for, protect, train, educate or discipline" her chil-
dren. However, the court went on to condemn the use of probation
officers' confidential reports in such proceedings under any circum-
stances.
It has not been customary and it certainly would be improper for
the Family Court to find jurisdictional facts-for example, acts con-
stituting the alleged delinquency on the part of a child, or abandon-
ment of a child, or unfitness of a parent-on the basis of such a con-
fidential report. Of those facts it is necessary that there be substantial
legal evidence in the record regardless of the informality of the hear-
ing. Once the jurisdiction of the court is established, however, the
Family Court Act enjoins that
the care, custody and discipline of the children brought before the court shall
approximate as nearly as possible that which they should receive from their
parents, and that as far as practicable they shall be treated not as criminals
but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance. 27
In the exercise of this duty the court is aided by probation officers
whom the statute requires "to make such investigations as may be re-
quired by the court. "28 The probation officer "is practically a guardian
ad litem" for the child and is an assistant of the court in the perform-
ance of judicial functions.29 The proceedings before the Family Court
rarely smack of adversary proceedings (although under section 2002
any interested party may request trial by a jury of six), 30 and, indeed,
the jurisdictional facts are commonly admitted by the persons before
the court.
Before the dictum in the Rosmis case is announced as a governing
point of law in Illinois, it behooves the courts at the appellate level to
make a careful analysis of all factors involved. The child before the
25 Id. at 8. (Emphasis added.) 27 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, S 2001 (1959).
26 26 111. App.2d 226, 167 N.E.2d 826 (1960). 28 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 2008 (1959).
29 Witter v. Board of Comm'rs, 256 111.616, 100 N.E.148 (1912).
80 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, S 2002 (1959).
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Family Court is legally an infant whose "liberty" is already severely
restricted by the State with respect to school attendance, employment
and property rights, and who ordinarily owes his services, wages and
obedience to his parents who have the power to choose for him, among
other things, his domicile and his baptismal faith. The judge in the
Family Court must always be alert to a situation in which the child is
as much in need of liberty from his circumstances as liberty to remain
there. As the statute implicitly recognizes,31 there may well be matter
as useful to the judge in developing a program of action as it would be
damaging to the child for him to disclose. The trial court's consider-
ation of a probation officer's report, in conjunction with the evidence
in the record, as he attempts to resolve the human problem before him
in the spirit of the act, should not be hastily condemned.
The question for analysis is whether due process for children in-
variably requires the full panoply of adversary procedure, or whether
due process may not be fully served by some better adapted technique
of achieving the substance of justice.
THE NEXT DECADE
This review of Family Court law and its development during the
past decade suggests at least two groups of questions for consideration
in the decade ahead:
I. To what extent should the jurisdiction of the Family Court be
exclusive and to what extent concurrent with that of the criminal
court? How shall this be achieved, and who should be empowered to
decide which avenue shall be taken in the case of concurrent jurisdic-
tion?
II. When may, or should, the State interpose its control over a
child, and what measures should it be empowered to take in various
circumstances?
(a) What is a fair and realistic definition of "delinquent" behavior?
(b) Are "dependency" and "neglect" sufficiently differentiated
that differing legal consequences should appropriately be attached to
each?
(c) Since the interests of the State, of the parent and of the child
are not necessarily identical, who represents the child before the Fam-
ily Court?
(d) What is due process for children? Are the considerations under-
lying decisions in cases involving adults applicable where children are
concerned?
31 ILL. REV. S'rA'r. ch. 23, § 2001-36 (1959).
